Debating a Threshold for Dissolution

One of the more immediately controversial results of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government is to be found in its negotiated agreement of a 55 per cent rule for dissolution.

Fearing the long-term viability and stability of the coalition pact, the parties agreed to a fixed-term parliament of five years and, to firm up the deal, declared that ‘legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.’ Presumably, the Lib Dems fear that the Tories will in time tire of the arrangement and seek a majority government at the polls. But without the necessary majority—in this case an ‘enhanced majority’—the coalition is relatively secure.

Details of this provision’s full impact remain murky and in much debate. Professor The Lord Norton of Louth has promised readers of his blog a full review to come, which we await eagerly.

In the meantime, one group has come out strongly against, No to 55, arguing that ‘introducing an “enhanced majority” for dissolution of the Commons may be politically expedient, but it’s not democratic.’

One of the more thoughtful attempts at a defence, however, has come from Telegraph writer Philip Johnston, who wrote:

If a government cannot command the support of parliament it falls and that remains the case under the new arrangement. If it loses a confidence motion by 50pc plus 1 it falls.

However, if a PM wants to cut and run for a general election at a time of his own chosing, he would need 55pc of MPs voting for it.

According to Johnston, ‘this idea is not a coup and is actually more democratic than the current system that places all the power for dissolving parliament in the PM’s hands.’

Two points are readily apparent:

1. First, on the face of it, requiring an ‘enhanced majority’ for a prime ministerial sponsored dissolution is undemocratic—and contradictory—when the parliamentary convention itself is 50 per cent + 1, and


2. Second, were government backbenchers to take their responsibility to hold the Executive—which includes their own leader—to account, no Prime Minister would request a dissolution of Parliament from the Crown were he to fear a backbench revolt. Ministers may be semi-cocooned from the people, but ordinary MPs never want for constituency feedback—and public reaction to an unwarranted dropping of the writs would surely be voiced and subsequently felt at the ballot box.

Equally important, if MPs adhered to the above model of an organic Parliament, there would be no need of fixed-term parliaments (which are promoted mainly as a way of frustrating First Ministers). Confidence would reside wholly with the House of Commons whose compliance would no longer be taken for credit.

None of the political actors involved deserve laurels for this constitutional innovation that occurred behind closed doors, among politicians on the cusp of power, bargaining amongst themselves. It is also likely the governing parties will insist upon a whipped vote.

More worrying still, are the people to be grateful that the threshold upon which the Conservative-Liberal Democrat negotiating teams agreed was 55 per cent? Based on this precedent, what is to impede subsequent thresholds of democracy-in-action to be 60 per cent, 65 per cent, or more?

So, ‘Welcome to the new politics’, Mr Johnston? What a foreboding invitation.