Lord Norton on Maintaining Accountability in Parliament

As promised, Professor the Lord Norton of Louth has posted some thoughts on two constitutional reforms that have come to the fore, particularly as a result of the agreement that led to coalition government. The reforms in question are proportional representation and an elected House of Lords.

Of the former, writes Lord Norton:

The fundamental argument against the use of PR for parliamentary elections is that it would destroy the core accountability at the heart of our political system. Our existing electoral system facilitates, but does not guarantee, the return of a single party to government. There is thus one body – the party in government – elected through elections to the House of Commons that is responsible for public policy. It has stood for election on a particular platform, against which it can be judged, and – most importantly of all – it can swept from office at the next election. Knowing that, it tends to be responsive to public opinion.

Of the latter, the problem with an elected House of Lords is that

it would be in a position to demand more powers than the existing House. It may not be co-equal to the first chamber but it would likely demand more powers than the existing House and be willing to exercise those powers. Election would change the terms of trade between the two chambers. There would be no reason why elected members of the second chamber would see the role of the chamber as a complementary one. There would be the potential for conflict between the two. This could lead to stalemate or more often to deals being struck. Such deals would be more likely to be to the benefit of parties and special interests than to the benefit of electors. There would be no clear line of accountability for what emerged or, indeed, what failed to emerge.

What ties PR and an elected second chamber together, in Lord Norton’s view, is accountability, or the lack thereof. Were this reform to be instituted in the House of Commons, voters would be less able to hold their representatives to account because

• First, in many forms of PR, electors vote for a party and not a person, with eventual MPs picked off party lists (with ‘loyal’ candidates often topping the charts), and
  
  
• Second, since PR most often leads to pluralities and not majority governments, parties must bargain and trade amongst themselves in order to form a working government—cobbling together deals and compromises for which no one voted in advance.

As to the House of Lords, an elected chamber would compete with the Commons for legislative supremacy—emboldened by its new democratic mandate—and the series of compromises that would be necessary between parties in a PR-constituted lower chamber would now be replicated by similar actions between it and the upper chamber.

Lord Norton is adamant in his opposition to these reforms, and I agree with his emphatic message: ‘If you believe in having a political system where there is a clear line of accountability between government and electors, then one needs to defend both the existing electoral system and an appointed second chamber.’